Wages, Experience and Training of Women over the Lifecycle by Blundell, Richard et al.
WAGES, EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF WOMEN OVER THE LIFECYCLE 
By 
Richard Blundell, Monica Costa Dias, David Goll, and Costas Meghir 
April 2019 
Revised June 2020 
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2174R 
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
http://cowles.yale.edu/ 




and Institute for Fiscal Studies
Monica Costa-Dias
Institute for Fiscal Studies
and University of Porto
David Goll
University College London
and Institute for Fiscal Studies
Costas Meghir
Yale University, NBER, IZA, CEPR
and Institute for Fiscal Studies
June 2020
Abstract
We investigate the role of training in reducing the gender wage gap using the UK-BHPS.
Based on a lifecycle model and using tax and welfare benefit reforms as a source of
exogenous variation we evaluate the role of formal training and experience in defining
the evolution of wages and employment careers, conditional on education. Training is
potentially important in compensating for the effects of children, especially for women
who left education after completing high school, but does not fundamentally change the
wage gap resulting from labor market interruptions following child birth.
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1 Introduction
Women’s careers are marked by interruptions related to childbirth and the resulting loss in
labor market experience. This, together with the fact that women often work part time while
children are growing up, underlies an increasing wage gap relative to men as well as to women
who continue an uninterrupted career as full time workers. The question we address in this
paper is whether work-related training has a role to play in reducing this wage gap and whether
it can be used to help reintegrate women in the labor market following a long absence.
In this paper we specify a model of female labor supply over the lifecycle including the choice
to obtain work-related training. In our model, women enter the labor market after completing
education. In each period they face a working hours and savings choice. Marriage, separation
and children arrive exogenously with a probability estimated from the data and depending on
prior children, age and marital status. The evolving family structure over the lifecycle is a key
feature because it affects the incentives and preferences of women for work and training. While
working their human capital grows through experience, at a rate depending on whether work
is part time or full time. Job separations imply a loss in human capital and hence earnings.
During their working life they may also participate in work-related training, which is paid for
by deductions from their earnings but increases human capital and therefore wages in future
periods. While we recognise that part of the cost of training and part of the return may
accrue to the firm, we do not explicitly model incidence. However, we do not impose that the
worker enjoys the full return to training: we allow the data to determine the returns to training
episodes for the worker based on wage data.
Our focus is on the two human capital enhancing activities, working and training. Each
of these activities responds to incentives in a different way, which poses interesting policy
questions. For example, passive learning in work is encouraged by any factor increasing the
incentives to work, such as in-work benefits (EITC in the US, WFTC in the UK). By making
working more desirable, these work conditioned policies may also mechanically increase the
1
amount of active work-related training over the life-cycle. Perhaps more interestingly, by top-
ping up low pay benefits can indirectly subsidise the cost of training associated with foregone
earnings, see Heckman et al. (2002). The design of the subsidy may also interact with the re-
turn to training in ways that may increase or reduce its return. Understanding the importance
of work-related training for human capital and wages is thus central to designing policy that
could help reduce the earnings costs of children on women. In turn, this discussion also reveals
that policy reforms changing incentives to work, and to work more, may also affect training
rates. In such case, they can be used to identify the effects of training on future wages. We
will exploit such variation together with our model to quantify these effects.
Our basic data source is the UK BHPS, a long panel running since 1991 with key labor mar-
ket and household information. Importantly, it includes detailed information on the incidence
and intensity of training. This information is similar to one of the first systematic analyses of
work related training by Altonji and Spletzer (1991). We supplement this with information on
welfare and tax systems in the UK over many years, which allows us to construct the precise
budget constraint that an individual is facing in each year of work. This leads us to our iden-
tification strategy: our data includes multiple cohorts, entering the labor market at different
times. Each is facing a different welfare and tax system implying changes in incentives. During
their lifetimes they face reforms that affect a number of cohorts but at different ages. This
generates exogenous variation in the incentives that people face at different parts of the distri-
bution. Thus individuals of different cohorts and education groups face both different work and
training incentives. This is the key idea that underlies our identification strategy and provides
the variation we need to estimate the model.
Our findings point to a potentially important role for training women who completed high
school level education but did not go on to complete University. We show that it can have a role
in reducing the wage loss that arises from part time work post children. Moreover, policies that
subsidize the training of recent mothers from this group can increase their disposable income
(beyond the taxation required to fund it) as well as overall welfare. We also find that a modest
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subsidy pays for itself by incentivising full-time work both during the eligibility period and after
it. Finally, while training can play some role in reducing the labor market costs of children,
this cost remains quite large even after systematic training policies. Other policies that would
reduce the incidence of part time work, such as better childcare availability, may have a more
important role to play.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we describe our data, followed by a
description of the institutional framework. We then carry out an empirical analysis to investi-
gate how incentives related to the tax and welfare system affect training. Having shown that
training is indeed sensitive to such incentives we specify our model and describe our estimation
approach, which uses the simulated method of moments. This section is followed by the de-
scription of the results including our counterfactual simulations. We then offer some concluding
remarks.
2 Data
Estimation uses the 18 yearly waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a
longitudinal dataset following the lives of families and their offshoots from 1991 to 2008. The
survey started with a representative sample of 5,050 households living in Great Britain; it was
later replenished in 1997 and 2001 with 1,000 households from the former European Community
Household Panel, and in 1999 with two samples of 1,500 households each from the Welsh and
Scottish extensions.1 Except for some attrition, all household members in the original samples
remain in the sample until the end of the period. Other individuals have also been added to
the sample, as they formed families with original members of the panel or were born into them.
The BHPS collects detailed demographic information that we use to characterise the dy-
namics of family formation, as well as socio-economic information mapping the education at-
tainment, labour supply, earnings, training events, childcare expenditures and assets of all
1An additional sub-sample from Northern Ireland was added in 2001 but is not used here.
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household members aged 16 and above. In 1992, 2001 and 2002, the BHPS contains an ad-
ditional module on lifetime histories that we use to recover the employment history of adult
respondents since they first started to work. Respondents also report retrospective information
on family background, including measures of parental education, number of siblings, sibling
order, whether they lived with parents when aged 16, books at home during childhood, etc. We
synthesise this information into two indices of socio-economic background that will be used to
qualify individual earnings capacity and choices.
Our observation unit is women who have completed education, are aged 19 to 60, and for
whom we observe complete employment histories. The histories of women who return to full-
time education to acquire additional qualifications are truncated. We also truncate the histories
of those who become self-employed at any point during the sample period, from that moment
onwards. Finally, we exclude women who are not UK citizens or who are ever observed claiming
disability benefits. The records of women in the cleaned sample are then linked to information
on a present partner and children as relevant.
Our final sample is an unbalanced panel of 7,359 women and 55,591 observations. We
arrange them into three groups by highest level of completed education, corresponding to
less than high-school, high-school qualifications and equivalent, and 3-year college degree and
above.2 Table 1 shows the sample composition by family type and education of the woman.
We consider both the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply and discretise the
distribution of labor supply to 3 points: not working for pay, which we take to be 0 hours in
paid work per week and corresponds empirically to the cases of workers doing less than 5 weekly
hours of work; working part-time, which we take to be 20 hours of work per week and combines
all those doing 5 to 20 hours; and full-time work, which we take to be 40 weekly hours and
combines workers doing 21 or more hours per week. The underlying measure of weekly hours
we use is for usual hours in main job, including paid and unpaid overtime. We also consider
2In the UK, these levels correspond, respectively, to GCSE qualifications (which are acquired at the end of
secondary school, at age 16) and below, A-levels qualifications (obtained at the end of high-school, aged 18)
and equivalent, and 3-year University degree and higher.
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Table 1: Sample size and distribution of family types by education
Education
Less than
high school High school University Total
Family type (%)
Single, no kids 15.1 21.0 24.7 18.2
Couple, no kids 34.6 33.6 35.6 34.4
Single, with kids 11.1 7.9 4.6 9.2
Couple, with kids 39.2 37.5 35.1 38.1
Employment (%)
Full-time (>20 hours) 53.2 68.9 77.3 61.2
Part-time (5-20 hours) 21.2 15.6 11.6 18.2
Nr of individuals 3,921 2,377 1,061 7,359
Nr of observations 30,802 17,419 7,370 55,591
Notes: BHPS data for the years 1991 to 2008.
only employees, and delete the paths of workers becoming self-employed, from that moment
onwards. More details on data selection can be found in the Online Appendix.
Wages are measured on a per-hour rate by dividing weekly earnings in main job including
paid overtime by weekly hours also in main job (including any overtime, as detailed above).
Since our model does not deal with macroeconomic fluctuations, we net out aggregate wage
growth from the wage rates and from all monetary values of the tax and benefit system, de-
scribed below in Section 3. We also trim the wage rate distribution, on the 2nd and 98th
percentiles, to limit the importance of measurement error in earnings and working hours.
Training Data. One distinctive feature of the BHPS is that it includes a detailed description
of all work-related training taking place during the year prior to the interview among those
currently employed. This measure of training is an umbrella to a wide variety of education
activities meant to increase or improve skills in work and that can be pursued while working full
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or part time hours. It includes part-time college or university courses, evening classes, employer-
provided courses either on or off the job, government training schemes, open university courses,
correspondence courses and work experience schemes, but excludes full-time education. Work-
related training amounts to over 80% of all recorded training episodes, of which 96% happen
among those in paid work at the time of the interview. The data documents the purpose of the
training (whether induction training in a new job, to gain skills for current job or to prepare
for some new job in the future), its total duration, who paid for any direct costs, where it took
place and whether it lead to any qualification.
Our measure of training is an indicator for whether the respondent has had strictly more
than 40 hours of training over the previous year. In calculating the total time in training
over the year, we have excluded instances of training for induction in a new job or where the
participants report as it being unrelated to work. Specifically, we only consider training spells
meant to increase the skills workers need in their current job (for example by learning a new
technology), or to prepare for a new job; we exclude training meant to help workers getting
started in their current job (induction training) or to develop skills generally (not work-related).
We also exclude the 4% of cases where trainees are not working. For the remaining instances
of training we first convert total duration – which can be reported in months, weeks, days or
hours – into hours assuming 8 or 4 hours in a day for those in full-time or part-time hours,
respectively. We then exclude all training episodes that result in 40 hours or less of training
per week since they seem likely to capture minor work-based certification programmes, such as
first-aid training.3 Conditional on our selection, 76% of the training we account for leads to
formal qualifications. This we take as suggestive evidence that the training considered here is
human capital enhancing and transferable across jobs and firms.
Table 2 briefly describes training spells among women, by education. We show figures for
our measure of training, labelled ‘selected’, and for a similar measure constructed on all work-
3In robustness checks, we have included induction related training and used a continuous training hours
measure. The life-cycle patterns and our regression analysis shows (discussed below) are not qualitatively
affected.
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related training, labelled ‘any’. Panel (a) of the Table shows that training is a common event,
with between 17 and 37 percent of employed women receiving some form of training in each
year. It is also much more common among those in the middle and top education groups. Our
more demanding measure of training accounts for just over 40% of all training spells. These
are non-negligible investments, with a median length of between 80 and 96 hours per year, or
between 2 and 3 full-time weeks (panel (b)). In a working year of 48 weeks, the median training
duration amounts to an average of about 2 hours of job-related training per week.
Panels (c) and (d) focus in Table 2 narrow the sample to include only trainees under our
preferred definition. Women who have not completed high-school education are more likely to
receive training at work (50%) than either High School educated women (36%) or University
educated women (28%). University educated women are often trained at work, at private
training centres. Around one-quarter of training occurs at a university or further education
college, across all three education groups. When explicit fees are charged for training, these
fees are paid by the employer in between 69 and 72 percent of instances. However, this measure
does not account for additional costs of training, such as the loss of income that could result
from fewer working hours.
3 Institutional background
The personal tax and welfare benefit systems operating in the UK during the 90s and 00s
all consist of a small set of individual-based taxes and a larger set of benefits that are mostly
means-tested on family income. Within the same structure, the period saw numerous reforms
to the specific parameters determining entitlement to benefits and tax liabilities. The most
significant was the sequence of reforms to the benefits of families with children that ocurred
between Autumn 1999 and April 2002, which introduced the Working Families Tax Credit
(WFTC) and changed the Income Support (IS) benefits for low-income families. We exploit
these reforms in addition to other smaller changes in taxes and benefits to identify the returns
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Table 2: Training descriptives for women by education (BHPS)
Education
Less than
High School High School University Total
(a) Training rates for employed (%)
Any training 17.1 33.4 37.0 27.4
Selected training 5.4 14.3 16.2 11.1
(b) Median hours of training for trainees (hrs per year)
Any training 24 40 40 32
Selected training 80 96 88 88
(c) Where did training take place (selected training, %)
At work 50.3 36.4 28.6 36.3
College/university 22.8 27.6 26.2 26.5
Other 26.9 35.9 45.2 37.2
(d) Who paid explicit fees, if charged (selected training, %)
Fees paid by employer 69.3 71.0 71.5 70.9
No fees paid by employer 30.7 29.0 28.5 29.1
Notes: BHPS data for the years 1991 to 2008. All figures exclude instances of education or training spells that are not work-related.
Training measured only for those in work at the time of the interview. ‘Selected training’ further excludes induction training and
instances of training that add up to 40 or fewer hours of training in the course of one year.
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to work experience and training and to study how welfare policy may affect training. We do
so by modelling women and their families living through two tax and benefit systems that are
representative of the main institutional features over the period of the data: that operating in
April 1995, describing the policy environment of the 90s, and that finally implemented in April
2002, after the WFTC-IS reform was completed. Here we describe the main features of these
systems; a more comprehensive discussion of the taxes and transfers in the UK can be found
in Adam et al. (2010) and Blundell et al. (2016).
In terms of tax liabilities, the main instruments targeting families are the Income Tax and
the National Insurance contributions. The basic structure of these taxes remained unaltered
over the period. Income Tax is progressive, a step function over four income brackets. The 1995
system comprised of a personal income disregard that was not taxed, and rates 20% (starting),
25% (basic) and 40% (higher) that were gradually applied to additional fractions of personal
income. The period saw a mild tax reduction, with a modest increase in the personal income
disregard and some reduction of the rates to 10%, 22% and 40%. This was partly compensated
by adjustments in the basic income threshold defining the brackets at which the starting and
basic rates apply, and by a small increase in the main rate of National Insurance contributions,
from 10% to 11%.
The UK benefit system is more complex. We model a range of benefits, including: Job-
Seekers Allowance (JSA), which is the UK unemployment benefit; Income Support (IS), a
minimum income floor that carries no work or job-search requirement; Tax Credits, a benefit
for working families; Child Benefit, a universal benefit for families with children; Housing
Benefit (HB), which subsidises housing costs for families who live in rented accommodation;
and Council Tax Benefit, which subsidises the local property tax. These benefits interact in
complex ways, so it is important to consider them together.
For mothers, the key components of the public transfer system are the IS and the Tax
Credits. These were also the focus of the WFTC-IS reform of 1999-2002, an intervention aimed
at improving the financial circumstances of low income families with children and keep mothers
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in work to protect their skills and labour market attachment. The reform implemented a
significant increase in the generosity and coverage of IS and Tax Credits. For lone mothers,
the IS award increased by over 10% relatively to wage levels over the period and remained
taxed at 100% marginal rate. Since this subsidy is not work-contingent, this aspect of the
reform reduced the incentives to work of mothers. The reform of the Tax Credit benefits,
however, counteracted the increase in out-of-work benefits with a generous increase in subsidies
for working mothers and an expansion of the target population to higher levels of family income.
This was implemented by a 25% rise (in constant wage levels) in the maximum award for lone-
mothers of one child, and a drop in the withdrawal rate from 70% to 55%. Over this period,
Tax Credits kept the minimum working hours eligibility rule of 16 hours per week as well as
the additional award for families working at or above the 30 hours threshold.
Figure 1 summarises the effects of these reforms on the take-home pay of single mothers. It
shows, in 2008 prices and for a lone-mother on the minimum wage of April 2004, her entitlement
(on the left) and disposable income (on the right) by working hours per week. The strong
incentive to work part-time hours is clearly visible both before an after the reform. It is also
apparent that the reform increased the incentive to work both part-time and more hours, by
increasing the award at 16 hours by more than it increased out-of-work benefits and by reducing
the rate at which in-work benefits are tapered away.
Figure 2 pictures the equivalent quantities for low-paid couples with one child aged 4 with
one spouse working 40 hours per week at the 2004 minimum wage, by working hours of the
second earner. Clearly, the reform had a much more modest effect on the disposable income of
couples and, if anything, it reduced the incentives to work of the second earner in the family
by taxing additional earned income more heavily.
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Notes: From Blundell et al. (2016). Simulations from FORTAX for lone-mother of one child aged 4, earning
the 2004 minimum wage, not paying housing rents or childcare. Graph on the right pictures the IS plus TC
award, graph of the left pictures the disposable income of the family; both in 2008 prices by working hours
of the mother.
4 Life-cycle profiles of employment and training
The life-cycle patterns of wages, labour supply and training are suggestive of how these
variables are linked for women, and of the motivations behind investments in training. Figure
3 shows the life-cycle profile of average log hourly wages of women and men, by education. The
dashed lines for women exhibit the typical strong gradient by education and a steep upward
profile early in the working life, particularly for high-school and university graduates. However,
women’s wages quickly flatten out during their late 20s or early 30s, coinciding with the main
fertility period. The flattening is permanent after that.
The solid lines for men show wages increasing with education and growing rapidly in the
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Notes: From Blundell et al. (2016). Simulations from FORTAX for couple of one child aged 4, not paying
housing rents or childcare, both spouses earning the 2004 minimum wage, one spouse working 40 hours per
week. Graph on the right pictures the IS plus TC award, graph of the left pictures the disposable income of
the family; both in 2008 prices by working hours of the second earner.
early years of working life. However, the wages of men continue to grow far later into working
life than the wages of similarly educated women, independently of education. The continued
growth of men’s wages compared to a flattening of women’s wage profiles opens up a gender
wage gap. For low educated women, this gap is already apparent by their early 20s. For higher
educated women, the gap opens in their late 20s. These patterns coincide with differences
across women by education in the timing of childbirth. For instance, 51% of women with less
than high school qualifications in our sample have at least one child by age 23. This compares
to 4% of University educated women. University educated women only reach comparable levels
at age 32, where 50% of our sample have at least one child.
This wage profile is accompanied by strong changes in labour supply. Figure 4 shows, on
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Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. Real wages measured on a per-hour rate in logs.
the left, that the employment rates of women dip in the middle of their working lives. The
dip happens earlier and is more pronounced for the lower educated. The right panel shows
the proportion working part-time among women in work. The same period witnesses a strong
growth in part-time hours that persists into late working life, particularly for those with high-
school qualifications and less. Overall, employment and full-time working hours seem strongly
complementary with education.
Blundell et al. (2016) documented these working patterns, related them to fertility episodes
and quantified their consequences for the wage progression of women with different levels of
completed education. What that paper did not consider, however, is how work-related training
interacts with education, labour supply, work experience and wages. Here we see training as one
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Notes: Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. The graph on the left shows employment rates by age and education. The
graph on the right shows the proportion of working women in part-time hours conditional on being in work, also by age
and education.
element of human capital, together with education and work experience. Whether these three
factors are complements or substitutes in the formation of wages will have consequences for the
intensity and timing of training across different groups. For instance, if training can be used
to offset human capital depreciation from non-working periods then it may be more prevalent
among women returning to the labour market after a long fertility-related interruption than
among men of similar age.
We start investigating this by contrasting the training patterns of women and men over the
course of life in Figure 5. Panel A of this figure shows training rates by gender and education for
all individuals, independently of work status (with training for those out of work always set to
zero). Several features are noteworthy. First, on-the-job training is very common among High-
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School and University graduates. There is a clear education gradient in training, with workers
with less than high school qualifications being much less likely to invest. This suggests that,
like work experience, the type of training that we measure is complementary with education
instead of being used to compensate for the lack of academic skills.4 Second, despite women
being much more likely to interrupt their careers during the main child-rearing period, the
training rates of women and men are surprisingly similar. This holds even at the start of
working life, at which point women may foresee a long career interruption linked to fertility in
the near future. Third, the overall pattern of training is downward slopping, as predicted by
the classical Mincer/Ben-Porath human capital framework. Noticeably, however, the slope is
not monotonic for women, particularly so for the more educated. Instead, training rates peak
for a second time when women in these education groups are in their 40s or early 50s, a period
that coincides with many of them returning to full-time work.
Conceivably, these patterns can be mechanically driven by the life-cycle of employment
among women. Specifically, since female employment rates drop markedly during the main
childrearing periods and recover once children are older, lower training rates at that stage and
their subsequent pick up may just reflect that movement out and back into work. Panel B
refutes that hypothesis by showing similar life-cycle variation in training rates among those in
work.
Figure 6 provides further insight on the timing of training by plotting its frequency around
the birth of the first child. It shows that the training rates are flat around the time of first
birth for women with less than high school qualifications, seemingly unaffected by childbirth.
In contrast, the training rates of women with high school or university qualifications vary
significantly around chilbirth, first declining to reach a minimum while the child is very young
and later partly recovering as the child moves to primary and secondary schools.
These patterns suggests a role for training in offsetting some of the losses in human capital
4One alternative explanation is that our measure favours training that is closer to the type that high educated
people receive, and that other types of training (needed, for instance, for manual jobs) are not captured by our
data.
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Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. The training variable is an indicator for having had 40 or more hours of work-related
training over the last 12 months. Panel A shows training rates for the entire population, by age, gender and education.
Panel B additionally conditions on working at least 5 hours per week on an usual week, which is the measure of employment
used in this paper. Lines are smoothed using a Epanechnikov kernel.
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Figure 6: Training rates among mothers and mothers-to-be in paid work, by time to/since birth
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Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. The training variable is an indicator for having had more than 40
hours of work-related training over the last 12 months.
and earnings capacity due to career interruptions, at least among mothers with High School
qualifications or more. It is unlikely though that training alone will be enough to close the kind
of gender differences in pay shown in figure 3. Even if the returns to training are similar to
those from additional years of formal education, training spells are generally much shorter and
so we would expect an effect that is proportionally adjusted. But training may, nevertheless,
speed up gains in skills that women lose during working interruptions and make work more
valuable for them.
The life-cycle patterns of training also suggest a role for public policies subsidising working
mothers that has received little attention so far (one notable exception being Heckman et al.
(2002). Specifically, working incentives targeting mothers – such as the UK Tax Credits that we
described before or the US Earned Income Tax Credit – may have unforeseen effects on the take
up of training through various channels. First, by making working more desirable they may
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mechanically increase the amount of training over the entire life-cycle. Second, by increasing
the number of periods that women are in work, wage subsidies will also increase the number of
periods over which women will reap the return from training, hence overall increasing the total
return to the investment. Third, by topping up low pay, the benefits may indirectly subsidise
the cost of training associated with foregone earnings. And finally, the design of the subsidy
may interact with the return to training among subsidised women in ways that may increase
or reduce its return.
5 Training responses to work incentives
One observation from the discussion in the previous sectin is that reforms in incentives to
work may provide useful exogenous variation to identify the impact of training on the earnings
of women. Existing studies have mostly focused on the impact of tax reforms on employment
and hours. For instance, it has been shown that the WFTC reform affected the labour supply
of lone-mothers (e.g. Brewer et al. (2006), Blundell et al. (2016)). Here we show that the
various reforms to the tax and benefit system that happened in the UK over the 90s and 00s,
of which the WFTC reform is a prominent example, also affected the probability that women
take-up training.5 This implies that tax and benefit variation can be used to help identify the
returns to training in the context of a life-cycle model.
Our empirical specification is very simple. We estimate the following regression model of
training T on a set of three simulated income variables that describe how working incentives


















In the above, the dependent variable Tit is an indicator for having had more than 40 hours
5We supplemented the variation in the monetary incentives to work with local variation in the availability
of training captured by a Bartik instrument. We found that geographical variation to be too weak to drive
training rates and dropped it.
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of training over the last 12 months for woman i at time t, and
(







tive simulated income variables. They measure family disposable income for three scenarios
of female labour supply, respectively not working (superscript O), working part-time hours
(respectively P ) and working full-time hours (F ). We use the tax system in place in period
t to simulate these incomes based on predicted female wages (on her age and education) and
details of the demographics of the family.6 Ŷ single out how policy reforms differentially affect
the resources of families of different types depending on the labour supply of women. We also
control for a set of other covariates X, which includes time dummies, a quadratic polynomial in
age, indicators for family composition, two indices that summarise parsimoniously a set of ob-
served variables characterising the socio-economic background of the woman.7 These variables
are meant to control for variation in the disposable income variables not induced by policy
reforms.
Table 3 displays the results, focussing on the income variables. It shows that changes in
incentives to work strongly affect the probability that women enrol in significant amounts of
training. The F-statistics at the bottom of the table show that this is especially true for the
two bottom education groups. This is not unexpected since public policies target the bottom of
the income distribution and are, therefore, more effective in influencing choices at that margin.
Estimates in Table 3 are for all women, regardless of their employment status. Since the
type of training that we are considering only happens among those in work, it could be thought
that our estimates are effectively capturing the effects of monetary incentives to work on em-
ployment, and through employment on training. To check this possibility, we estimated the
same regression model for the restricted sample of women in paid work. Results are shown in
Table A1 in the Online Appendix. They demonstrate that this is not the case, particularly
6We use the IFS micro-simulation program Fortax, which provides a detailed description of the taxes and
benefits operating at each time period.
7The indices are the first and second principle components of a set of observed retrospective variables on
parental background, from when the woman was 16 years of age. They summarise information on the education
of both parents (five levels each), number of siblings and sibling order (dummies for no siblings, three or more
siblings, and whether respondent is the first child), books in childhood home (three levels) and whether lived
with both parents when aged 16.
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Table 3: Regression of training on simulated income
(1) (2) (3)
Less than
High School High School Degree
Simulated income: no work (Ŷ O) -0.000254∗∗ -0.000280 -0.000178
(0.0000881) (0.000145) (0.000209)
Simulated income: part-time (Ŷ P ) 0.000606∗∗∗ 0.000524∗ 0.000751∗
(0.000146) (0.000238) (0.000376)
Simulated income: full-time (Ŷ F ) -0.000705∗∗∗ -0.000878∗∗∗ -0.000960∗∗∗
(0.000105) (0.000150) (0.000223)
Observations 30383 17260 7328
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Age polynomial (2nd order) Yes Yes Yes
F-Test on Instruments 20.93 15.53 8.312
F-Stat p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. Outcome variable is an indicator for whether the woman has taken more than
40 hours of work-related training during the year that precedes the interview. Estimates show effects of simulated
family disposable income for different levels of female labour supply on the probability of taking up training. The
simulations are constructed using a detailed microsimulation model for the UK. We use the tax system in place in
period t to simulate these incomes based on predicted female wages (on her age and education) and details of the
demographics of the family. The regressions also control for year dummies, demographic characteristics (including
a quadratic in age and dummies indicating family composition) and family background (including the first two
principal components drawn from a collection of variables that describe the childhood household of each individual
and an indicator for whether this information is missing). The F-statistics at the bottom of the table test the joint
significance of the three simulated income variables. Standard errors, shown in parentheses under estimates, are
clustered at the individual level.
for women in the middle education group. For them, the F-statistics that we estimate is still
strong (at 8.8). The effect of the simulated income variation is weakest for college graduates
(F-statistic of 6.4) and in between the two for the group of women with less than high school
qualifications (7.3). Given the strength of the policy variation in affecting the training rates of
high school graduates and the fact that training is very prevalent among women this group as
well, our focus will be on this group for the remainder of the paper.
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6 The model
We study training choices and their value for earnings through the lens of a life-cycle model
of labour supply and human capital (HC) formation. Our model builds on the life-cycle model of
female education, labour supply and experience capital of Blundell et al. (2016) by integrating
on-the-job training in the process of HC formation and by adding a layer of heterogeneity that
shapes the returns to HC investments. Here, however, we focus on a homogeneous education
group.
6.1 Overview of the model and its key components
We consider the adult life of women, after completing education. Following our discussion of
training incidence and training incentives, we focus on the key group of women who completed
high school but did not complete a degree. Our model considers labour supply, training,
consumption and savings choices of women from the moment they enter the working life at the
age of 19. Adult life is split in two periods, the working period and the post-retirement period.
Retirement is assumed to happen deterministically at the age of 60. Once retired, women stop
working and live out of the savings they accumulated during working life (Fan et al. (2017)).
All women initiate their adult life as singles with no children. They are characterised by
various dimensions of ex-ante permanent heterogeneity, some observed and others not. The
observed heterogeneity is captured by two indices of family background, describing the socio-
economic conditions of their parental home when they were aged 16. These affect their pro-
ductivity in and preferences for work. The other component of observed heterogeneity is the
cohort to which women belong. Different cohorts are affected by different sequences of work
incentives shaped by the policy reforms, which may affect their working and training choices.
Ex-ante unobserved heterogeneity is two-dimensional. It includes one ability component,
which directly affects wages, and one preference component, which drives the utility costs
of working hours and training. We assumed that these two dimensions of heterogeneity are
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perfectly correlated. The structure of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is clearly specified
below, when we set out preferences and wages.
During their working life, women decide in each period whether to work and for how many
hours, whether to invest in training if they are working, and how much to consume today
and save for the future. Labour supply is modelled in three hour-points, corresponding to not
working, working part-time and full-time. Training is fixed at 2 hours per week, the median
value of the distribution of training conditional on it exceeding 40 hours over the previous year,
or 1 full-time working week worth of training.
Working has present and future returns, in the form of earnings and experience capital
respectively. Earnings are proportional to the number of working hours net of time in training,
with an hourly wage rate that depends on the stock of human capital, the woman’s ability type
and a persistent productivity shock. Human capital is represented by a single index, and is
endogenous in our model. It accumulates over the life cycle through working experience and
training episodes; it depreciates during out-of-work periods, formalising the idea that career
interruptions carry long-term consequences for earnings capacity.
In a competitive labour market framework with general training, workers bear the full cost
of training and capture its entire return. However, firm-specific training and labour market
frictions may change this result, instead creating the grounds for firms and workers to share
the costs and returns from training (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), Lentz and Roys (2015)). In
our model, we do not explicitly consider the role of firms and the labour market in determining
how the cost and return to the investment is shared between workers. We assume that training
carries a monetary cost equal to foregone earnings due to time taken away from work, and
that it bears a return through HC that is reflected in future wages. However, we also allow
training to carry a utility cost that may partly capture, in a reduced-form sense, incidence
in the cost of training. It also captures other drivers of training, such as actual preferences,
effort or congestion in training places. In the same vein, the contribution of training to the HC
index also has a reduced-form interpretation. It represents a combination of its effect on the
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accumulation of skills and the sharing of their productive value with the firm. Training may
also contribute to employer learning about productivity as in Altonji and Pierret (2001). They
conclude that training has a mixed role, both as enhancing human capital and compensating for
the depreciation of skills acquired in formal education, but also as a mechanism that supports
employer learning. However, the nature of the data does not allow them to estimate the relative
importance of these factors.
In our framework we give a pure human capital interpretation to the effects of training.
Investments in training are driven by various mechanisms that also determine their timing and
return. Crucially, if wages are concave in HC then the monetary cost of training is lower and
returns are larger when HC is low. This creates stronger incentives to invest at the start of
the working life – when there is also a longer period ahead to bear returns, as in a Ben-Porath
model – and when returning to work after long separations, to compensate for the depreciation
of skills.
Other key components of the model also create rich interactions with employment and train-
ing choices and their returns. One is the stochastic process of family formation and dissolution,
which maps out the formation and dissolution of couples and fertility episodes. The model re-
produces the empirical marital sorting patterns and fertility histories of women whose highest
education qualification is high school ( Chiappori et al. (2009), Chiappori et al. (2018)).
Finally, choices of consumption are restricted by liquidity constraints. The family budget is
determined not only by the earnings of the woman but also by those of a present partner, tax
liabilities and public transfers. In particular, the model embeds a detailed description of the
personal taxes and benefits operating in the UK and how they change over the sample period.
This is implemented using the micro-simulation tool FORTAX (Shaw (2011)).
6.2 Female wages and human capital
We consider the problem of a woman aged t and, for simplicity of notation, omit the
individual index. If working, this woman draws a per-hour wage that depends on the human
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capital she accumulated so far (κ), indicators for whether the family background factors are
above or below their median in the population (x1, x2), permanent ability type ω, and an
idiosyncratic persistent productivity shock ν. The latter follows an AR(1) process with normal
innovations ζ and initial value drawn from a normal distribution. Formally, the wage equation
is
lnwt = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + (γ0 + γ1x1 + γ2x2) ln (κt + 1) + ω + υt
where υt = ρυt−1 + ζt
(2)
We allow for classical measurement error in wages by defining observed wages wm as follows
lnwmt = lnwt + ξt where ξt ∼ iid.
Gross pay y depends on workings hours h. Women can choose to work either 0 hours, 18 hours
or 38 hours, representing out-of-work, part-time and full-time hours respectively. Total working
time also depends on whether the woman takes time to train as follows
yt = wt(ht − dth̄d) (3)
where d is an indicator for training and h̄d is training time, which is exogenously set to 2 hours
per week.
Human capital κ is accumulated in work, at a rate that depends on working hours and
training status, and depreciates at a constant rate δ per period. The human capital process is
κt+1 = κt (1− δ) + g1 (ht) + g2 (ht) kt + τ1dt + τ2dtkt
κt = 0
(4)
g1 and g2 define how human capital accumulates with work. We allow for the human capital
gains from work to depend on the number of working hours and to vary linearly with human
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capital accumulated so far. Both g1 and g2 are set to 0 if the woman is not working, and g1 is
also set to 1 if she works full-time; other values are estimated. τ1 and τ2 measure the human
capital return to training, which we also allow to vary linearly with the stock of human capital.
The woman starts her working life at time t with an initial stock of human capital equal to
zero.
Our model of wages and human capital formation implies that training is both cheaper and
draws larger returns (if, as expected, γ0 + γ1x1 + γ2x2 < 1 and τ2 ≤0) when human capital is
low. This reinforces the incentive to invest young in order to bear the returns for longer. It also
makes training investments more valuable after the long career interruptions common among
mothers of young children, if these interruptions carry a significant loss of skills that would be
implied by a large depreciation rate δ.
The wage equation also exhibits complementarity between human capital and ability, im-
plying that high ability workers have more to gain from training activities that enhance human
capital. But since high ability workers also pay a higher cost in terms of foregone earnings, the
overall effect of ability on training take-up is ambiguous.
6.3 The employment and earnings of the spouse
Let mt = 0, 1 be an indicator for the presence of a partner at time t. We denote his charac-
teristics and outcomes by adding a ‘tilde’ to his variables. Although his labour supply choices
and human capital process are not endogenously modelled, we adopt a stochastic specification
that captures the main features of the richer female model.
The spouse at time t is characterised by his education s̃t and his productivity level υ̃. The
distribution of his education reproduces that observed empirically among spouses of high-school
graduated women. To limit the size of the state space, his age is assumed to equal that of the
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woman, t. If working, his wage rate is
ln w̃t = b̃s̃ + γ̃s̃ ln (t− 18) + υ̃t (5)
where υ̃t = ρ̃s̃υ̃t−1 + ζ̃t. (6)
υ̃ is the productivity shock, initially drawn from a s̃t-specific normal distribution when the
couple is formed and later modelled as a s̃-specific auto-regressive process with normal iid
innovations ζ̃. As for women, we interpret transitory wage shocks as measurement error and
specify the observed wages of the spouse as
ln w̃mt = w̃
m
t + ξ̃t where ξ̃ ∼ iid.
In line with the empirical evidence, we consider only two labour supply points for men in
couples: they are either not working, in which case their working hours h̃ are set to zero, or
working full-time hours, with h̃ = 40. Their employment process is
In new couples: Prob
[
h̃t = 40 | t, s̃t,mt−1 = 0
]
= ψ0 (t, s̃t) (7)
In existing couples: Prob
[







6.4 The budget constraint
Family resources include both the earnings of the woman, those of a present partner and
net public transfers. Let at represent the stock of assets that the family brings into period
t. Each period choices are limited by a liquidity constraint ruling-out borrowing. The budget
constraint is formalised in terms of the evolution of assets:
at+1 = (1 + r)at + yt +mth̃tw̃t − T (wt, ht, Xt)
at+1 ≥ 0 and at = 0 and at̄+1 = 0
(9)
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In the above expression, r is the risk-free interest rate, t is the start of working life, and t̄ is
the last period of life, set at 10 years after the retirement age of 60. We assume that women
enter their working life with no assets, which is consistent with empirical evidence, and that
any remaining assets have no value after t̄.
T is the tax and benefit function. It depends on the wage rate of the woman, her work-
ing hours (because the UK tax credits have an hours rule) and on all other state variables
characterising the demographic and financial circumstances of the family, summarised in X.
In particular, X includes presence of children and age of the youngest child, marital status,
whether present partner is working and his wage rate. We use the detailed microsimulation
tool, Fortax, to calculate T .8
6.5 The dynamics of family formation
We adopt a flexible Markov model to capture the dynamics of fertility, marriage and divorce.
To preserve computational tractability while representing the key drivers of female labour
supply, we only keep track of the age of the youngest child but allow for multiple fertility
events. Let tk denote the age of the youngest child in the family. Childbirth is represented by
re-setting tk to zero and happens at a rate that depends on the woman’s age, whether she has




tk = 0 | t, nkt−1, tkt−1,mt−1
]
(10)
It is assumed that a child lives with her parents until turning 19, at which point she determin-
istically leaves her parents’ home.
The probability that a woman marries or remains married to a man of education s̃ depends
8Fortax describes most of the UK personal taxes and benefits and how they changed over the period we
model, including income tax, social security contributions, and the main subsidies for working-age families,
namely income support, job-seekers allowance, tax credits, housing benefit, council tax benefit, child benefit.
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on her past marital circumstances, her age, whether she has children, and the education of her
spouse if he is present in the previous period,
if single at t− 1: Prob
[
mt = 1, s̃ | t,mt−1 = 0, nkt−1
]
(11)
if married to man s̃ at t− 1: Prob
[
mt = 1, s̃ | t,mt−1 = 1, s̃, nkt−1
]
(12)
Otherwise she will be single at time t.
6.6 Utility and value functions
In each period t of her working life, the woman decides about total family consumption (c),
savings (a), her own labour supply and training investments to maximise her lifetime utility.
Working life starts at t = 19 for our sample of High School graduates. It ends deterministi-
cally at 60 when the woman retires, after which family savings fund an additional 10 years of
consumption.
We assume intertemporal separability in preferences. The per-period utility of her choices
depends on her preference type, θ, and a subset of the state variables Xt that characterise her
circumstances at age t:




exp {U (ht, dt, θ,Xt)} . (13)
In the above expression, n is the equivalence scale, factoring in family size,9 and µ is the
parameter determining both the degree of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
The function U reflects how the value of additional consumption varies with working hours
and training status by family composition for women of different θ types. We decompose it into
two additive terms, one relating only to working hours, Uh, and the other driving the utility
9n = 1 for singles, 1.6 for couples 1.4 for mother with child and 2 for a couple with children.
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cost of training, UT :
U (h, d, θ,X) = Uh (θ,X1) + d× UT (h, θ,X2) (14)
with (Uh, UT ) defined as follows
Uh (X1) =
 0 for h = 0lh(θ) + αhX1 for h = 18, 38 (15)
UT (h, θ,X2) = lT (θ) + αTX2 + αT,h. (16)
In the above, we denote by X1 and X2 the two relevant subsets of state variables (not mutually
exclusive) that directly affect preferences for working hours and training, respectively, and
by (αh, αT ) their associated parameters. X1 includes a full set of interactions between marital
status and whether she is a mother, indicators for age of youngest child in bands (0-2, 3-5, 6-10),
and the background factors (x1, x2). X2 includes indicators for whether or not she is a mother
and age of youngest child in bands. Equation (16) also includes an interaction term between
working hours and training status (αT,h). Heterogeneity in preferences θ takes two values, for
low and high preferences for work, and is assumed perfectly correlated with heterogeneity in
ability ω. The terms (lh(θ), lT (θ)) measure the importance of unobserved preferences for work
and training in driving choices.
The intertemporal problem of the woman can now be formalised. Let β be the discount
factor. Her problem in period t of her working life is
Vt (ω, θ,Xt) = max










The term b (κt) represents the value of human capital at retirement. It is meant to capture
the fact that human capital will have some value post age 59, both because some women will
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remain active in work and because human capital is valuable outside work as well. This values
is specified as follows,




The maximisation problem in 17 is conditioned by the budget constraint (9), the female wage
and human capital processes (2)-(4), the dynamics of employment and wages of a present
partner (5)-(8) and the dynamics of family formation (10)-(12). The woman starts her working
life as a single woman with no children.
7 Estimation
We estimate the subset of model parameters driving female wages, human capital formation
and preferences for working hours and training using the method of simulated moments. The
values for all other parameters are taken from Blundell et al. (2016). These include the subset of
parameters defining the pre-determined family dynamics, male employment and male wages. A
description of their estimation procedure and the full set of estimates can be found in their Web
Appendix B. Three other parameters are set at typical values in the literature: the parameter
regulating the curvature of the utility function µ is set at −0.56, implying a risk aversion
coefficient of 1.56; the risk-free interest rate r is set at 0.015 and the discount factor β at 0.98,
together implying that agents are mildly impatient (Blundell et al. (1994), Attanasio and Weber
(1995), Attanasio et al. (2008)).
Estimation relies on a set of 139 moments capturing various aspects of lifecycle behavior and
wages.10 We construct the simulated moments to reproduce their data counterparts, based on
10The moments include full- and part-time employment and training rates by age, family demographics,
socio-economic background, and interactions between calendar time and demographics; employment and hours
transition rates by family demographics and past wages; the mean, variance and percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion over the course of life and at entrance into working life; the correlation between wages and socio-economic
background, years of work, working hours, training and past wages; the growth rate of wages by past working
hours, training and socio-economic background.
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the simulation of 5 lifetime profiles for each of the 1,443 high school educated women who are
observed in BHPS with observed socio-economic background and life histories of employment.
From the resulting 7,215 profiles we select a window that exactly matches the observation
window of the corresponding woman in the survey data. This way, we exactly reproduce the
time, age and socio-economic structure of the data.
Our estimation procedure uses the exogenous variation in the labour supply and training
incentives from policy reforms. Using regression analysis, we showed in section 5 that such
exogenous variation was important for high school graduates and may play an important role
in driving the results for them (Andrews et al. (2017)).
Within the model we use the policy variation by considering four tax and benefit systems,
namely the ones operating in April 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2004. The reforms are unannounced.
Our moments include pre- and post-2002 measures of employment, working hours and train-
ing that explicitly capture the variation induced by the reform. Responses to the reform are
likely to vary by cohort, as they are differently exposed to the reform, and individual permanent
characteristics. We exploit these interactions to identify the value of working and training for
future wages, by explicitly modeling the differential exposure to the reforms of different cohorts
and by allowing responses to depend on socio-economic background.











where K is the total number of moments used in estimation, Mdκ,N is the estimate of moment κ
from N observations of observed data and M sκ,S is the corresponding moment calculated on S
model simulations for parameter values Θ.11 We calculate asymptotic standard errors following
11It is implicit in the maximisation criterion that we are not using the optimal asymptotic weighting matrix,
following the suggestion of Altonji and Segal (1996). Instead, we use the diagonal matrix of inverse variances
of the moments, which are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.
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Gourieroux et al. (1993).
8 Parameter estimates and implications for behaviour
8.1 Wages, human capital and the return to training
Table 4 shows estimates of the female wage process. Estimates in panel A of the Table
are for the wage rates at the start of working life (b0) and the return to human capital (γ0).
Socio-economic background has a relatively small (but statistically significant at conventional
levels) effect on starting wages; in turn, the return to human capital does not vary significantly
with socio-economic background. Our estimate of the return to human capital in wages (γ) is,
as expected, smaller than 1. Combined with the log linear specification of the wage equation,
this implies that the return to one additional unit of human capital decrease with the stock
already accumulated. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in the wage rates (ω) is important (see
estimates in Panel B of the Table). Our estimates indicate that being high ability raises the
wage rate by 24 log points compared to the average.
Uncertainty in wages is characterised by the persistent unobserved productivity process ν.
Our estimates in Panel C suggest that though this process is highly persistent, with autocor-
relation coefficients of around 0.95, there is a high level of wage uncertainty. There is also
substantial heterogeneity in initial wages.
Training affects wages through its impact on human capital. Our estimates show the in-
cremental effect of training over work experience for the duration of training; i.e. they show
how much more human capital workers gain if they choose to take time away from working
and use it to train instead. The top row of Table 5 shows the estimate of this effect for women
at the start of working life, when they have not yet accumulated human capital from work
(τ1). Our estimate suggests that, at that stage of the working life, training increases human
capital by 16 percent of the return to one year of full-time work (which is normalised to 1). We
allow for more flexibility in how training affects human capital, and hence wages, by adding
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Table 4: Wage parameters
Parameter Value St. Error
Panel A: Wage coefficients
Intercept, exp(b0) 6.86 (0.065)
increment: high factor 1, exp(b1) 0.64 (0.093)
increment: high factor 2, exp(b2) -0.31 (0.028)
Return to human capital, γ0 0.27 (0.004)
increment: high factor 1, γ1 -0.04 (0.005)
increment: high factor 2, γ2 0.03 (0.004)
Panel B: Unobserved heterogeneity in ability, ω
ω type I: wage effect 0.24 (0.012)
ω type I: probability 0.79 (0.002)
Panel C: Distribution of persistent productivity shock ν
Persistence of productivity, ρ 0.95 (0.002)
St. dev. of productivity innovation, ζt 0.12 (0.003)
St. dev. of initial productivity, υ0 0.27 (0.007)
an interaction term with the stock of human capital (τ2 in the second row of the table). Our
estimates, however, suggest that this term is not needed.
Table 5: Parameters in the human capital accumulation process
Parameter Value St. Error
training, τ1 0.16 (0.008)
training × human capital, τ2 0.00 (0.004)
part-time, g1(18) 0.13 (0.009)
part-time × human capital, g2(18) 0.00 (0.003)
full-time × human capital, g2(38) -0.02 (0.005)
depreciation rate (δ) 0.08 (0.002)
The magnitude of the effect of training is slightly larger than the human capital return from
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working part-time hours, which are estimated to be 13 percent of the full-time return at the
start of working life (g1(18) in second row of the Table). We also allow for an interaction term
with the stock of human capital (g2(18)), and again find no evidence of the need to allow for
more flexibility in how part-time hours affect human capital and wages. The only interaction of
the stock of human capital that is statistically significant at conventional levels is that with full-
time hours (g2(38)), but even there the effect is small. Our estimate shows that one additional
unit of human capital reduces the human capital return to full time hours by 2%. Since human
capital never increases beyond 12 in simulations, at the maximum this parameter is responsible
for a 24% drop in the human capital return to one year of full-time work.



























0 10 20 30
t
Training in tenth year of work
Notes: Percentage change in wage rates due to single episode of training in years 1 (LHS panel) and 10 (RHS panel) of full-time
work. Agent is assumed to have no human capital at t = 0 except for that acquired through formal education and is working
full-time over the entire period.
The size of the impact of training on wages depends on the interactions between its impact
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on human capital (determined by τ1) and its wage return (determined by a combination of
(γ0, γ1, γ2) for different groups), the depreciation rate (δ), and the stock of human capital at
the time of training. Figure 7 illustrates the overall short- and long-term wage effects of one
episode of training taking place at different stages of the working life. The plot on the left shows
the impulse response to one training episode in year 1 of working life for women in full-time
hours; the plot of the right shows the equivalent figure if training happens after 10 years of
full-time work.
There is a modest but not insignificant initial effect on wage rates that, however, declines
quickly as the additional human capital depreciates over time. The initial effect is much more
pronounced if training is taken earlier in the working life, prior to the building up of human
capital with working experience and consistent with decreasing marginal returns to investments
in human capital. For instance, training increases the wage rate by 1.5% if taken in the first
period of work, but only by 0.4% if taken after 10 years of working full-time. The falling
returns to training with accumulated human capital is an important determinant of the timing
of training in our model.
Our estimates of the wage impact of training can be compared with estimates of the im-
pact of one additional year of education found in the broader literature once adjusted for the
relatively small number of hours spent in training. Assuming that school requires thirty hours
of study per week and takes place over forty weeks, a year of schooling requires 1,200 hours
of time investment. This is approximately 12 times longer than the 100 hours corresponding
to a training episode within our model. Card (1999) surveys the vast literature on returns to
education and finds estimates implying increases in wages of between 5% and 15% associated
with an additional year of high school, or approximately 0.4% to 1.3% per 100 hours invested.
Blundell et al. (2005) estimate a wage return of 24% for the two years of education differenti-
ating High School graduates from those who leaving school at 16 (with less than high school
qualifications) in the UK context, or approximately 1% per 100 hours invested. Our estimates
of the initial return from training at the start of working life fall on very similar values.
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No training W/ training
Notes: Solid lines represent the wage penalty, in log points, from moving to continuous part-time work after 10 years of continuous
full-time work. The dotted lines factor in continuous training starting in year 10, together with part-time working hours.
In Figure 8 we document the extent by which training can offset the part time penalty in
wages. The diagram compares the loss in wages that results from a shift from full-time work to
(a) part-time work (solid line) or (b) part-time work plus training (dashed line). It represents
how the impact of training compares with that of part-time hours. The solid lines in the figure
show that part-time work is associated with a large wage penalty. The dashed lines show that
taking training together with part-time hours offsets almost one third of the part-time penalty.
8.2 Utility parameters and the cost of training
Tables 6 and 7 show estimates of the parameters driving the utility cost of work and training
as defined by the index functions Uh and UT in equations 15 and 16. In both Tables, a positive
parameter reflects higher costs of working or training.
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Table 6: Parameters determining utility cost of working
Parameter Value St. Error Parameter Value St. Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Utility Parameters in Uh
Full-Time Employment Part-Time Employment
(α38) (increment: α18 − α38 )
Singles, no children 0.56 (0.006) -0.37 (0.004)
Single mothers 0.47 (0.011) -0.22 (0.009)
Married, no children 0.33 (0.014) -0.23 (0.015)
Married mothers 0.34 (0.013) -0.24 (0.012)
Child aged 0-2 0.16 (0.009) -0.07 (0.008)
Child aged 3-5 0.11 (0.010) -0.05 (0.009)
Child aged 6-10 0.06 (0.010) -0.04 (0.006)
Spouse working -0.07 (0.013) 0.08 (0.012)
High background factor 1 0.02 (0.008) 0.00 (0.005)
High background factor 2 0.03 (0.008) -0.02 (0.005)
lh(θ) type I -0.38 (0.178) 0.00 (0.005)
In order to rationalise the observed employment rates at the given monetary incentives to
work, the model requires working to carry a utility cost for all groups (see estimates in columns
1 and 2 of Table 6). The costs are lower for married women than for single women, partly
offsetting differences in incentives to work between the two groups due to spouse’s income and
benefit entitlement. Moreover, a working spouse brings down the utility cost of working, a
result in line with past research showing complementarity in spouses’ leisure (Blundell et al.
(2016)). Mothers of young children, particularly of pre-school age, also face higher costs of
working. Columns 3 and 4 of the Table report estimates for the incremental effects of working
part-time hours, showing that part-time is less onerous in utility terms than full-time hours.
Estimates for the parameters governing the utility cost of training are shown in Table 7.
We have fixed the monetary cost of training to equal the foregone wage for 2 hours of training
per week, or 104 hours per calendar year, which corresponds in the data to the median level of
training among trainees undergoing more than one week of training over the year. The utility
cost of training is identified from the discrepancy between the predicted take up of training (if
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Table 7: Parameters determining utility cost and benefits of training and the terminal value of
human capital
Parameter Value St. Error
Utility Parameters in UT , (αT , αTh)
(1) Single, no children 0.002 (0.010)
(2) Single mothers 0.007 (0.008)
(3) Married, no children -0.002 (0.015)
(4) Married mothers -0.002 (0.016)
(5) Child aged 0 to 2 0.010 (0.025)
(6) Child aged 3 to 5 0.004 (0.014)
(7) Child aged 6 to 10 0.003 (0.008)
(8) Spouse working 0.009 (0.014)
(8) High background factor 1 0.004 (0.007)
(8) High background factor 2 0.002 (0.005)
(9) Part-time interaction 0.016 (0.006)
(10) lT (θ) type I -0.028 (0.003)
Terminal Value of Human Capital
(11) Scale parameter, φ1 0.05 (0.009)
(12) Curvature parameter, φ2 0.21 (0.137)
costs were zero) and the actual take up.
Most parameters in the utility of training are small and mostly not statistically significant
at conventional levels: the utility cost of training does not seem to depend on the demographic
structure of the household or even on the family background factors. Perhaps this is not
surprising since most of the cost associated to the household structure relates to the decision to
work or not and once that has been paid it is no longer relevant for the training decision itself.
However, the interaction with part-time hours (row 9) shows that training is more costly when
women are doing short working hours; and the unobserved heterogeneity term (row 10) shows
that the group with higher preferences for work also has a positive preferences for training
(which mirrors a higher training cost for those with lower preferences for work). Thus, given
our estimated returns to training our model rationalizes observed training cost as a preference
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for training among higher ability women (which constitute 80% of the population according to
estimates in Panel B of Table 4). A model that admits search frictions or other imperfections
could provide a structural interpretation of this since in that case the firm and the worker share
the costs of training.
Figure 9: Model versus data – Training incidence among working mothers, by time since/to
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Our model implicitly points to two additional mechanisms explaining the life-cycle patterns
of training. First, families with children have higher needs and may be more likely to face
liquidity constraints. In those circumstances, the foregone earnings associated with training
may be an especially high cost to pay that could drive training rates down during that period
of life. And second, the expected return to training may be negatively affected by motherhood
as higher career intermittency limits women’s ability to reap its full return before depreciation
eventually washes out the human capital gains from training.
Figure 11 plots age profiles for the average total cost of training on the left, including both
the monetary cost associated with lost labour time and the monetized direct utility cost. We
39
Figure 10: Model versus data – Training incidence over the life-cycle among working women,
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compare this to the consumption value of the additional human capital acquired through one
episode of training on the right. In line with the observed training rates, average cost exceeds
average return by a factor of 2 for most age groups. Figure 12 plots similar figures but by
time to/from the birth of the first child. The life-cycle variation is strongly associated with
the dynamics of family demographics through employment behaviour rather than through the
utility cost of training. The returns to training also change around childbirth but by a much
more modest amount, and then slowly recover as the child grows up.
Finally, the last two rows in table 7 show the parameters associated with the terminal value
of human capital at the time of retirement. The scale parameter φ1 is positive, which implies
that human capital is valuable in retirement.
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Figure 11: Monetised total cost of and experience return to training across whole population,
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8.3 Responses of employment and training to changes in prices
We use the model to quantify responses to changes in the monetary incentives to work
and train. Table 8 shows responses in employment rates (Panel A) and training rates among
employed women (Panel B) to changes in the wage rates (column 2) and in the earnings foregone
while training (column 3). Column 1 provides a sense of scale by displaying the simulated levels
of employment and training by family demographics. All simulations are run under the 2002
tax system.
Column 2 reports average immediate response to an unanticipated and permanent 5% de-
cline in the post tax wage rate starting at each age in the 23 to 50 interval. Overall, this change
leads to a 2% decline in employment on a base of 85.7% displaying the dominance of the wealth
effect. The response is larger for mothers, particularly single mothers, than it is for women
without children, reflecting their larger labour supply elasticities. While training responses to
changes in the wage rates are smaller than those of employment, they are nevertheless impor-
tant given current training rates. A permanent drop in wages reduces future returns to training,
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Figure 12: Monetised cost of and experience return to training across whole population, by
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(b) Consumption value of extra human capital
Notes: Left-hand panels show average monetary compensation required to equalise period utility between
(1) working full-time and not training and (2) working full-time and training. Right-hand panel shows the
average monetary deduction required for an individual to be indifferent to receiving additional human capital
equivalent to one unit of training.
but that is offset by the negative impact it has on the current cost of training. We find that
the latter dominates leading to a small overall increase in training rates particularly for single
mothers. Finally, column 3 in the Table shows that the training responses to a drop in the cost
of training are large, particularly for single women. In turn, employment does not respond to
changes in training incentives.
The parameters in Table 8 are key to inform policy as they reflect the potential responses
in employment and training to reforms changing the monetary incentives to do so. They are
consistent with the observed effects of the WFTC reform on employment and training. These
are described in the set of moments we used to identify the model, and displayed at the bottom
8 rows of tables A2, A3 and A4. We can see that the model closely fits the employment and
training rates before and after the reform for all family types.
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Table 8: Model simulations – Employment and training responses to changes in wages and the
monetary cost of training
level (%) 5% permanent decrease 5% permanent decrease
in net earnings in training cost
(a) Employment
All women 85.7 -2.0 0.0
By family demographics
Singles, no kids 93.3 -1.4 0.0
Single mothers 69.7 -4.2 0.0
Couples, no kids 94.3 -0.8 -0.1
Mothers in couples 79.0 -2.6 0.0
(b) Training
conditional on employment
All women 16.7 0.3 2.1
By family demographics
Singles, no kids 16.3 0.0 3.0
Single mothers 10.3 0.7 2.9
Couples, no kids 18.4 0.3 1.6
Mothers in couples 16.6 0.2 1.9
Notes: Calculations based on model simulations. Column 2 shows effects of an unanticipated and uncompensated 5%
permanent decrease in net earnings, on the employment and training rates in the period the change in earnings is first
realised. Column 3 shows effects of an unanticipated and uncompensated 5% permanent decrease in the foregone earnings
cost of training, on the employment and training rates in the period the change in costs is first realised. In all case, responses
are averages of effects for women aged 23 to 50.
9 Counterfactual simulations and discussion
9.1 Subsidized training for mothers
We now investigate the long-term impacts of subsidizing training for mothers of young
children, who may have especially loose links to the labor market. The policy could impact the
labor market outcomes of these mothers in two ways. First, by increasing training rates among
eligible mothers, it may help recover some of the losses in productive human capital associated
with career interruptions once mothers return to work. Second, the subsidy may also reduce
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the duration of career breaks by indirectly promoting employment during the early stages
of motherhood. The results from the previous sections suggest that mothers are especially
sensitive to the cost of training and that training has modest but positive effects on wages,
so the question is whether subsidizing training could help close the cost of child-rearing for
mothers.
We compare outcomes under the 2002 tax and benefit system with three modified regimes
that introduce training subsidies. In all three cases, mothers of children aged 7 or younger are
entitled to subsidies of different levels of generosity if they decide to take up training.
Our simulations quantify the long-term effects of these policies for women living through
the new regimes over their entire lives. All effects are calculated under revenue neutrality, with
any costs being recovered through adjustments in the basic tax rate from the tax liabilities
net of benefit entitlements of this group of women and their partners. The way one achieves
revenue neutrality is relevant since, for example, changing the tax rate to fund subsidies has
its own incentive effects.
Table 9 shows model predictions of the effects of subsidized training on training rates,
employment, hours, wages, savings, income and welfare. The first column displays the effects
of a £500 lump-sum subsidy for mothers of children aged 0 to 7 in training. The second column
increases this to £1500, and in the final column the subsidy provides full compensation for the
monetary cost of training, which includes foregone earnings. The subsidy policy is made revenue
neutral with a change in the basic tax rate.
Under our assumption of standard training units of 2 hours per week, the £500 annual
subsidy amounts to approximately £5 per hour. This is not a trivial subsidy, making up about
40% of the average hourly wage rate of eligible mothers. However, it is more modest than
other work related subsidies such as Tax Credits because it only supports a limited amount of
training.
The results in the first column show that training rates respond strongly to the subsidy
during the eligibility period (panel (a)), as suggested by the responses to a drop in the monetary
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cost of training described in table 8. Moreover, the effect quickly fades to 0 in later periods
when mothers lose eligibility (panels (c) and (e)).
The subsidy is timed to coincide with the fall in training we observe around the birth of
first child. Figure 13 shows, as an example, the impact of the subsidy on the prevalence and
timing of training. The fall in training at the time of childbirth, which is observed in the data
and replicated by our baseline model, is completely offset by the subsidy. As a result, training
rates decline gradually over the lifecycle, resembling the male training profiles discussed above
(see Figure 5).
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The least generous subsidy has a small impact on full time employment, increasing it by
0.64 percentage points during the first 7 years of the child, which corresponds to the period
of entitlement (panel (a)). All of this extra time in paid work comes from those who were
previously doing part-time work, resulting in a net effect on employment close to zero. The
small net response in employment is aligned with predictions of how employment responds to
changes in the cost of training, detailed in Table 8.
Panel (b) shows that the cumulative effect of the additional training and full time work on
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the wage rates of women at the end of the eligibility period is positive, with mothers benefiting
from a 0.31% increase in wages. This demonstrates that the policy has a small but not negligible
impact on the human capital of mothers at the end of the eligibility period. The subsidy also
reduces savings by a modest 0.12% when the child reaches 8 years of age. This suggests that
the additional human capital the woman accumulated over this period will make future work
more likely and she will need to rely less on savings.
Indeed we find that the small impacts on human capital and assets at the end of the
eligibility period drive similarly small dynamic effects. Panels (c) and (e) confirm that that the
policy slightly increases employment after the eligibility period, and that all increase is on the
full-time margin. These responses drive an increase in the lifetime disposable income of the
families of these women by 0.24% (panel (d)) and a larger increase in equivalised consumption
of 0.83%.12 Since the counterfactual simulation is revenue neutral, all these responses are net
of the tax adjustment. In the case of this less generous policy, we find that it pays for itself.
By bringing more women into full-time work for an extended period, the government raises in
extra taxes the funds required to implement the subsidy (panel (g)).
Column 2 of the Table shows similar results for a more generous lump-sum subsidy of £1,500
per year, or about 120% of the pay of eligible mothers during training episodes. The additional
generosity comes with a high price, requiring an increase of 0.5pp in the basic tax rate to balance
the public budget. For comparison, Blundell et al. (2016) calculations suggest that funding for
the 2002 Tax Credit scheme in the UK adds 0.9pp to the basic tax rate. Despite its cost, which
is fully borne by this population of women and their partners, our simulations show that this
policy is welfare increasing and drives up disposable income by more than the less generous
policy. These effects result from the strong impact that the policy has on the training rates of
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eligible mothers, which increase by 41 percentage points, and their employment rates, which
also increase by 3 percentage points. The combined effect of these responses result in higher
wages at the end of the eligibility period, by 2.6% (panel (b)) that drive later employment gains
and persistent increases in wages (by 0.72% when the child reaches 19 years of age).
The lump-sum subsidies provide a stronger incentive for those in low pay, who may also
benefit less from training if they are from the low ability group or on a flatter wage trajectory
induced by low (persistent) productivity shocks. We therefore re-designed the subsidy to exactly
cover the foregone earnings of trainee mothers of children aged 0 to 7. Results for this policy
are displayed in column 3 of Table 9. Because this type of design incetivises training among
higher paid mothers, it also ends up being more expensive for each trainee than the generous
£1,500 lump sum subsidy, costing £1,600 per trainee. However, it draws fewer women into
training than the lump-sum benefit because it is less generous for lower paid women. So in
the end the cost of such policy is smaller than that of the more generous lump-sum transfer,
requiring an increase of 0.15pp in the basic tax rate to balance the public accounts. Its effects
lie between the figures in the first two columns of the table, for the two lump-sum subsidies.
10 Conclusions
We have estimated a lifecycle model of female labor supply, and human capital accumulation
through work experience and training. Our main aim has been to understand the role that job
training can have in offsetting the loss of experience resulting from having children, which leads
to an increasing wage gap for women with children.
Training can be important for wages and we show that it can partly offset the wage gap
attributable to the prevalence of part time work and non-employment following a return to the
labor market after having children.
Finally, we evaluate a policy of subsidizing training for mothers with children younger than
8. All policies are revenue neutral and funded by increasing taxes. A fixed modest subsidy of
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£500 increases the take up of training substantially and leads to small but persistent gains in
wages, lifetime disposable income and welfare. It also pays for itself. We also consider other
less effective and more expensive approaches.
This paper has ignored the all important question of incidence for the costs of training as
well as for the returns. In a classical competitive labor market workers pay for general training
and wages fully reflect returns to investment (Becker 1964). But in the presence of frictions
this may not occur; firms and workers may share both the returns and the costs of training.
While here we measure correctly the returns to the individual and attribute some of the costs
to them we have not considered the returns to the firm of individuals being trained or how the
firms and the workers may share the costs. This is a central question, all the more so if we
are to understand why college graduates have such high levels of job training but little or no
observed return. In a follow up paper we are investigating this issue based on a model inspired
by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) (see also Flinn et al. (2017), Lentz and Roys (2015)).
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Table 9: Impact of training subsidies
Annual training subsidy
£500 £1500 Full compensation
(a) Child aged 0-7
Training 9.33 40.95 19.84
Employment 0.02 3.14 0.01
Full-time 0.64 1.37 1.35
Part-time -0.62 1.77 -1.34
(b) Child aged 8
Assets (%) -0.12 0.51 0.69
Wages (%) 0.31 2.60 1.36
(c) Child aged 8-18
Training -0.19 -0.38 -0.31
Employment 0.10 0.52 0.15
Full-time 0.41 -0.30 0.20
Part-time -0.31 0.82 -0.05
(d) Child aged 19
Assets (%) -0.05 0.24 0.29
Wages (%) 0.14 0.72 0.44
(e) Child aged 19+
Training 0.00 -0.03 0.03
Employment 0.21 0.26 0.23
Full-time 0.72 0.26 0.62
Part-time -0.51 0.00 -0.39
(f ) Lifetime outcomes
Disposable income (%) 0.24 0.35 0.23
Consumption equivalent (%) 0.83 0.74 0.77
(g) Revenue neutrality adjustment
Basic income tax change -0.02 0.5 0.15
Notes: Calculations based on model simulations. Column 1 shows the effects of a £500 yearly subsidy, while
columns 2 shows similar calculations for an yearly subsidy of £1,500. Column 3 shows simulated figures for
a subsidy that exactly covers foregone earnings of trainee mothers. In all cases, only mothers of children
aged 0 to 7 are entitled to the subsidy if taking training. Age of the child in panels (a) to (e) refers to the
youngest child in the family. The change in disposable income (panel (f)) is net of the tax adjustment. The
consumption equivalent in the same panel is calculated at the start of working life to keep expected lifetime
utility constant. All changes are in percentage points unless otherwise stated.
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Estimation is based on all 18 yearly waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
covering the period from 1991 to 2008. Apart from those who are lost through attrition, all
families in the original 1991 sample and subsequent booster samples remain in the panel from
then onwards. Other individuals have been added to the sample in subsequent periods, some-
times temporarily, as they formed families with original interviewees or were born to them.
All members of the household aged 16 and above are interviewed. We select the sample of
women in all types of family arrangement observed while aged 19 to 59.
Some definitional and data preparation procedures should be mentioned for clarity. Em-
ployment is determined by present labor-market status and excludes self-employment. The
paths of women who report being self-employed are deleted from that moment onwards. This
partly eliminates the trajectories of 889 women of the original sample of 7,755 women, drop-
ping 6,569 individual-year observations. Similarly, we truncate the paths of women who re-
port returning to full-time education after they have entered the labor market. 764 individu-
als are observed returning to full-time education, for whom we drop their pathways from that
moment onwards, amounting to 4,737 individual-year observations. We start with 67,399 and
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end with 56,093 individual-year observations after the cleaning trajectories after they cross
self-employment or full-time education. We also drop observations for women for whom the
age of children are missing or look wrong. This leaves 55,591 individual-year observations in
our final dataset.
Only women working 5 or more hours per week are classified as employed. We consider
employment choices from the age of 19 for women with secondary and high school educa-
tion, and from the age of 22 for women with university education. Working hours refer to the
usual hours in main job including overtime. We discretized labor supply using a three-point
distribution: not working (0 to 4 hours per week, modeled as 0 hours), working part-time
(5 to 20 hours per week, modeled as 18 hours), and working full-time (21 hours or more per
week modeled as 38 hours). The employment status and working hours observed at one point
in the year are assumed to remain unaltered over the entire year. Earnings are the usual
gross weekly earnings in the main job. (Hourly) wage rates are the ratio of weekly earnings
to weekly hours capped at 70. The wage distribution is trimmed at percentiles 2 and 99 from
below and above, respectively, and only for women working at or above 5 hours per week to
reduce the severity of measurement error in wage rates.
Wage rates are detrended using the aggregate wage index and all other monetary pa-
rameters in the model, including all monetary values in the annual sequence of tax and ben-
efit systems, were deflated using the same index. To construct this index, we run three re-
gressions, one for each education level, of trimmed wages on time dummies and dummies of
Scotland and Wales. We create three education-specific wage indices from the coefficients in
time. Then we aggregate these indices using the distribution of education for the entire popu-
lation of workers aged 25-59 in the sample to form the wage index. Any real monetary values
(using the CPI) are then rescaled using this index.
Family type includes four groups: single women and couples without children, lone
mothers, and couples with children. Women are assumed to have children only after finish-
ing education, once entering the labor market. Cumulated work experience is measured in
2
years. Individual assets at the beginning of adult life are the total of savings and investments
net of debts. They are truncated at zero, never allowed to be negative.
Our full data set remaining after the sample selection procedure described above, used
for the descriptive graphs and tables, is an unbalanced panel of 7,359 women observed for
some varying period during the years 1991 to 2008. A great deal of information is collected
for them, including family demographics, employment, working hours and earnings as well
as those of a present partner, women’s demographics such as age and education, demand for
childcare and its cost.
Within the model, we focus on “high-school” educated women. These women have com-
pleted A-levels or equivalent qualifications, which are acquired at the end of high school at
the age of 18. They do not possess a first degree level or post-graduate level qualification.
High-school educated women are 32% of the individuals in our full sample and 31% of obser-
vations. Moreover, for inclusion in our model sample we require observation of historical data
on the characteristics of their parental home when they were aged 16, including whether lived
with parents, parent’s education, employment status, number of siblings and sibling order,
books at home. Of the 2,377 individuals with high-school education, we observe the family
background for 1,443 (60.7%). These individuals form the basis for our moment estimates
and the initial conditions of the model.
Figure A1 and A2 replicate Figure ?? from the main text, using a slightly different
method. Rather than smoothing training rates using a local polynomial, we have binned in-
dividuals into five year age ranges and presented the average training rate for each bin along-
side the 95% confidence interval. Figure A1 presents the training rates of men, while Figure
A2 presents the training rates of women. In each case, Panel A presents the unconditional
training rates and Panel B presents training rates conditional on working. The training rates
of men appear to decline steadily over the lifecycle, whereas training rates of women decline
at first but increase somewhat during their 40s.
For completeness, we have included below an alternative version of Table ?? in the
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main text. Whereas the table presented in the main text includes all individuals in our sam-
ple, including those who are not employed, Table A1 conducts the same regression condition-
ing on working more than 5 hours per week. The sample is significantly smaller and the in-
struments lose some power, particularly for low education individuals. However, simulated
full-time income retains strong explanatory power for training among the employed.
We also present some additional graphs showing the fit of the model in terms of em-
ployment and part-time hours over the lifecycle (Figure A3) and over age of the oldest child
(Figure A4).
Tables A2 to A18 display the full list of data moments used in estimation, together
with their simulated counterparts and the normalized (by the data standard error) differences
between the two. Estimation used 139 moments, which fall into the following categories:
• Mean employment, part-time hours and training conditional on demographics (Table
A2, A3 and A4)
• Mean employment and training conditional on age band (Table A5 and A6)
• Transition rates from unemployment to employment conditional on demographics (Ta-
ble A7)
• Transition rates from employment to unemployment conditional on demographics and
wage decile (Table A8)
• Mean, variance and quantiles of log wage at entrance to working life (Table A9)
• Log wage regression in first differences on training dummy and change in log experience
(Table A10)
• Log wage regression on lagged wage, family background, log years of work experience
and lagged log years of work experience (Table A11)
• Log wage regression on training, experience and working status last period (Table A12)
4
• Log wage regression on age and family background (Table A13)
• Mean yearly change in wages conditioning on working status last period (Table A14)
• Mean wages and proportion of population with wages below pre-defined empirical wage
deciles, conditional on working hours and training (Table A15, A16 and A17)
• Mean log wages conditional on family background (Table A18)
All moments are constructed from the BHPS and are education-specific. Among the
139 simulated moments, 19 fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the respective data
moment, but many amongst these are very similar to their BHPS counterparts.
Table A1: Regression of training conditional on employment
(1) (2) (3)
Secondary High School Degree
Sim Income: 0 hours -0.0000393 -0.000134 -0.000133
(0.000123) (0.000171) (0.000237)
Sim Income: 20 hours 0.000436∗∗ 0.000389 0.000711
(0.000198) (0.000288) (0.000434)
Sim Income: 40 hours -0.000668∗∗∗ -0.000793∗∗∗ -0.000922∗∗∗
(0.000148) (0.000181) (0.000255)
Observations 22739 14658 6537
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 7.259 8.787 6.369
F-Stat p-val 0.0000751 0.00000862 0.000282
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: BHPS data. Outcome variable indicates whether the individual is observed in more than
40 hours of work-related training. Sample is conditioned on working at least 5 hours a week.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Demographic controls include a quadratic in
age and dummies indicating family composition. Family background controls include the first two
principal components drawn from a collection of variables that describe the childhood household
of each individual and an indicator for whether this information is missing.
5








































































































































































































Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. The training variable is an indicator for having had 40 or
more hours of work-related training over the last 12 months. Panel A shows training rates for the
entire population, by age and education. Panel B additionally conditions on working at least 5
hours per week on an usual week, which is the measure of employment used in this paper. Dashed
line shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Notes: BHPS data for years 1991-2008. The training variable is an indicator for having had 40 or
more hours of work-related training over the last 12 months. Panel A shows training rates for the
entire population, by age and education. Panel B additionally conditions on working at least 5
hours per week on an usual week, which is the measure of employment used in this paper. Dashed
line shows the 95% confidence interval.
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Table A2: Mean employment during working life
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Panel A: Averages by demographics
All 0.837 0.829 0.010 0.791
Single women, no child 0.914 0.920 0.011 0.505
Married women, no child 0.938 0.935 0.010 0.300
Lone mothers 0.682 0.644 0.041 0.948
Married mothers 0.731 0.730 0.019 0.039
Partner working 0.837 0.847 0.012 0.883
Youngest child 0-2 0.602 0.570 0.025 1.309
Youngest child 3-5 0.713 0.714 0.024 0.047
Youngest child 6-10 0.777 0.762 0.025 0.616
Youngest child 11+ 0.854 0.870 0.023 0.683
Family background: factor 1 0.825 0.834 0.014 0.633
Family background: factor 2 0.841 0.850 0.014 0.612
Panel B: Impact of benefit reform
Pre-1999: single women, no child 0.084 0.076 0.018 0.439
Pre-1999: married women, no child 0.110 0.098 0.013 0.917
Pre-1999: lone mothers -0.251 -0.217 0.053 0.648
Pre-1999: married mothers -0.101 -0.079 0.016 1.398
Post-1999: single women, no child 0.071 0.104 0.015 2.291
Post-1999: married women, no child 0.093 0.114 0.013 1.657
Post-1999: lone mothers -0.081 -0.156 0.044 1.699
Post-1999: married mothers -0.111 -0.119 0.015 0.551
Notes: Moments in Panel A are average employment rates (measured as working five or more hours per week)
among individuals with the listed demographic and background characteristics. Moments in Panel B are the devia-
tion in percentage points of each of the family types employment rates from average employment rates in the period
indicated.
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Table A3: Mean part-time employment during working life
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Panel A: Averages by demographics
All 0.164 0.170 0.009 0.723
Single women, no child 0.062 0.074 0.011 1.104
Married women, no child 0.096 0.100 0.012 0.348
Lone mothers 0.173 0.205 0.036 0.901
Married mothers 0.277 0.272 0.016 0.317
Partner working 0.191 0.193 0.011 0.160
Youngest child 0-2 0.257 0.280 0.020 1.163
Youngest child 3-5 0.321 0.316 0.024 0.200
Youngest child 6-10 0.281 0.280 0.024 0.010
Youngest child 11+ 0.196 0.165 0.027 1.116
Family background: factor 1 0.158 0.135 0.012 1.928
Family background: factor 2 0.179 0.187 0.013 0.590
Panel B: Impact of benefit reform
Pre-1999: single women, no child -0.115 -0.106 0.018 0.502
Pre-1999: married women, no child -0.068 -0.070 0.014 0.158
Pre-1999: lone mothers -0.054 -0.010 0.035 1.264
Pre-1999: married mothers 0.128 0.115 0.015 0.805
Post-1999: single women, no child -0.089 -0.086 0.015 0.201
Post-1999: married women, no child -0.068 -0.070 0.012 0.169
Post-1999: lone mothers 0.059 0.075 0.044 0.350
Post-1999: married mothers 0.100 0.088 0.014 0.813
Notes: Moments in Panel A are average rates of part-time hours (measured as working between 5 and 20 hours a
week) among employed individuals with the listed demographic and background characteristics. Moments in Panel
B are the deviation in percentage points of each of the family types part-time hours rates from average part-time
hours rates in the period indicated.
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Table A4: Mean training during working life
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Panel A: Averages by demographics
All 0.160 0.169 0.007 1.291
Single women, no child 0.173 0.185 0.014 0.901
Married women, no child 0.173 0.174 0.010 0.087
Lone mothers 0.162 0.177 0.028 0.545
Married mothers 0.138 0.141 0.011 0.334
Partner working 0.152 0.155 0.008 0.370
Youngest child 0-2 0.086 0.080 0.013 0.436
Youngest child 3-5 0.127 0.119 0.016 0.503
Youngest child 6-10 0.159 0.149 0.017 0.606
Youngest child 11+ 0.192 0.196 0.018 0.212
Family background: factor 1 0.158 0.148 0.009 1.053
Family background: factor 2 0.165 0.163 0.010 0.188
Part-time hours 0.069 0.069 0.008 0.018
Panel B: Impact of benefit reform
Pre-1999: single women, no child 0.026 0.030 0.017 0.252
Pre-1999: married women, no child 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.343
Pre-1999: lone mothers 0.032 0.035 0.044 0.072
Pre-1999: married mothers -0.030 -0.034 0.012 0.330
Post-1999: single women, no child 0.000 0.009 0.014 0.674
Post-1999: married women, no child 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.538
Post-1999: lone mothers -0.006 -0.014 0.025 0.340
Post-1999: married mothers -0.017 -0.019 0.010 0.190
Notes: Moments in Panel A are average training rates (measured as spending more than 40 hours in training over
the last 12 months) among employed individuals with the listed demographic and background characteristics.
Moments in Panel B are the deviation in percentage points of each of the family types training rates from average
training rates in the period indicated.
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Table A5: Employment by age
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
20 - 24 years 0.850 0.919 0.015 4.552
25 - 29 years 0.822 0.840 0.016 1.106
30 - 34 years 0.794 0.806 0.018 0.641
35 - 39 years 0.792 0.813 0.020 0.997
40 - 44 years 0.855 0.850 0.020 0.231
45 - 49 years 0.895 0.865 0.020 1.470
50 - 54 years 0.893 0.868 0.022 1.099
55 - 59 years 0.886 0.884 0.026 0.099
Notes: Moments are average employment rates (measured as working five or
more hours per week) for individuals in each of the age bands indicated.
Table A6: Training by age
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
20 - 24 years 0.168 0.214 0.015 2.994
25 - 29 years 0.165 0.152 0.013 1.016
30 - 34 years 0.152 0.158 0.013 0.449
35 - 39 years 0.163 0.165 0.015 0.136
40 - 44 years 0.170 0.160 0.014 0.704
45 - 49 years 0.176 0.161 0.018 0.887
50 - 54 years 0.160 0.144 0.018 0.883
55 - 59 years 0.113 0.111 0.020 0.121
Notes: Moments are average training rates (measured as spending more than
40 hours in training over the last 12 months) for employed individuals in each
of the age bands indicated.
Table A7: Transition rates from unemployment to employment
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
All 0.251 0.275 0.017 1.372
Single women, no child 0.408 0.301 0.048 2.220
Married women, no child 0.187 0.218 0.035 0.869
Lone mothers 0.212 0.283 0.019 3.805
Notes: Moments are average transitions from unemployment (working less than 5 hours) to em-
ployment (working at least 5 hours) for individuals with the listed demographic characteristics.
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Table A8: Transition rates from employment to unemployment
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
All 0.050 0.051 0.003 0.528
Single women, no child 0.027 0.025 0.003 0.852
Married women, no child 0.086 0.148 0.016 3.809
Lone mothers 0.082 0.080 0.007 0.339
wt−1 below 1st decile 0.124 0.102 0.014 1.505
wt−1 below median 0.068 0.072 0.005 0.726
wt−1 below 9th decile 0.050 0.055 0.003 1.609
Notes: Moments are average transitions from employment (working at least 5 hours) to unem-
ployment (working less than 5 hours) for individuals with the listed demographic characteristics
or with wages in the previous period below the indicated quantile.
Table A9: Log wage at entrance to working life
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Mean 2.123 2.134 0.038 0.295
Variance 0.149 0.137 0.015 0.784
Mean: high background factor 1 2.137 2.151 0.045 0.316
Mean: high background factor 2 2.055 2.117 0.059 1.051
wt below 1st quartile 0.250 0.223 0.043 0.625
wt below median 0.500 0.487 0.051 0.251
wt below 3rd quartile 0.750 0.813 0.045 1.391
Notes: Moments are mean and variance of wages at entrance to working life, mean of wages at the
entrance to working life conditional on the indicated background characteristic, and the proportion
of individuals with wages below specific quantiles of the empirical wage distribution at entrance to
working life.
Table A10: Log wage regression in first differences
∆ ln(wt) = β0 + β1∆ ln(κt + 1) + β2dt−1 + εt
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Diff in log years of work exp: ∆ ln(κt + 1) 0.189 0.235 0.019 2.431
Lagged training dummy: dt−1 -0.000 0.005 0.006 0.843
Notes: Moments are coefficients of the regression shown above, where κt is the observed years of full-time work experience
and dt−1 is a dummy for spending more than 40 hours in training over the last year.
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Table A11: Log wage regression on accumulated experience and lagged wages
ln(wt) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3 ln(wt−1) + β4 ln(1 + κt) + β5 ln(1 + κt−1) + εt
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Constant 0.424 0.400 0.032 0.773
High background factor 1: x1 0.016 0.012 0.006 0.648
High background factor 2: x2 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.959
Lagged log wages: ln(wt−1) 0.802 0.810 0.010 0.828
Log years of work exp: ln(1 + κt) 0.174 0.221 0.055 0.836
Lagged log years of work exp: ln(1 + κt−1) -0.139 -0.192 0.048 1.103
Variance of εt 0.053 0.055 0.002 0.907
First-order auto-corr of εt -0.011 -0.014 0.001 3.587
Notes: Moments are coefficients of the regression shown above, where x1 and x2 are dummy variables indicating above
median family background factors and κt is the observed years of full-time work experience. Sample for regression is
conditional on being employed last period, since we cannot observe wt−1 for unemployed individuals.
Table A12: Log wage regression on lagged experience, working hours and training
ln(wt) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3 ln(1 + κt−1) + β41(ht−1 = 38) + β51(ht−1 = 18) + β6dt−1 + εt
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Constant 1.939 1.878 0.038 1.575
High background factor 1: x1 0.059 0.062 0.022 0.135
High background factor 2: x2 0.020 0.028 0.022 0.332
Log years of work exp: ln(1 + κt) 0.162 0.157 0.011 0.446
Lagged full-time dummy: 1(ht = 38) 0.241 0.284 0.025 1.709
Lagged part-time dummy: 1(ht = 18) -0.023 -0.015 0.030 0.251
Lagged training dummy: dt−1 0.089 0.120 0.013 2.433
Notes: Moments are coefficients of the regression shown above, where x1 and x2 are dummy variables indicating
above median family background factors, κt is the observed years of full-time work experience, ht−1 indicates full-
time or part-time working hours last period and dt−1 is a dummy for spending more than 40 hours in training over
the last year.
Table A13: Log wage regression on age and family background
ln(wt) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3t+ εt
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Constant 2.109 2.229 0.041 2.949
High background factor 1: x1 0.053 0.047 0.023 0.232
High background factor 2: x2 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.274
Age: t 0.114 0.078 0.009 3.995
Notes: Moments are coefficients of the regression shown above, where x1 and x2 are dummy variables
indicating above median family background factors and t is age in years.
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Table A14: Mean yearly change in log wages given working hours at t− 1
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Working full time at t− 1 0.030 0.021 0.002 4.313
Working part-time at t− 1 -0.016 0.009 0.006 4.227
Not working at t− 1 -0.002 -0.006 0.012 0.378
Notes: Moments are coefficients of regression of mean yearly change in wages on dummies variables
indicating working hours last period. Mean yearly change in wages is measured as wages this period
minus wages when last observed in employment divided by number of years since last observed in
employment. It is therefore observed for any individual who has been employed in at least one previous
period.
Table A15: Other moments in log wages conditional on full-time work
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Mean log wages 2.603 2.597 0.011 0.568
wt below 1st decile 0.100 0.102 0.006 0.438
wt below 1st quartile 0.250 0.258 0.010 0.787
wt below median 0.500 0.523 0.013 1.793
wt below 3rd quartile 0.750 0.763 0.011 1.139
wt below 9th decile 0.900 0.892 0.007 1.164
Notes: Moments are mean log wages for individuals working full-time (measured as work-
ing more than 20 hours a week) and the proportion of individuals with wages below specific
quantiles of the empirical wage distribution of full-time workers.
Table A16: Other moments in log wages conditional on part-time work
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Mean log wages 2.382 2.342 0.020 2.019
wt below 1st decile 0.100 0.083 0.009 1.934
wt below 1st quartile 0.250 0.212 0.015 2.431
wt below median 0.500 0.493 0.022 0.302
wt below 3rd quartile 0.750 0.830 0.019 4.150
wt below 9th decile 0.900 0.972 0.012 5.763
Notes: Moments are mean log wages for individuals working part-time (measured as working
between 5 and 20 hours a week) and the proportion of individuals with wages below specific
quantiles of the empirical wage distribution of part-time workers.
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Table A17: Other moments in log wages conditional on training
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
Mean log wages 2.660 2.675 0.014 1.103
wt below 1st decile 0.100 0.093 0.009 0.784
wt below 1st quartile 0.250 0.268 0.015 1.278
wt below median 0.500 0.547 0.019 2.545
wt below 3rd quartile 0.750 0.764 0.016 0.887
wt below 9th decile 0.900 0.871 0.010 3.071
Notes: Moments are mean log wages for individuals in training (measured as spending more
than 40 hours in training over the last 12 months) and the proportion of individuals with wages
below specific quantiles of the empirical wage distribution of trainees.
Table A18: Mean log wages by family background
Moment Data Simulated SE data Norm. SE diff
High background factor 1 2.552 2.554 0.014 0.082
High background factor 2 2.578 2.571 0.015 0.487
Notes: Moments are mean log wages for individuals with the indicated background characteristics.
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